One-of-a-kind installations are commonly found in industrial / manufacturing occupancies, and also in some commercial occupancies. Losses in one-of-a-kind systems resist investigations based on same-system experience and superficial comparisons to other losses. To an experienced engineer, one-of-a-kind systems are still composed of subsystems that should be familiar by function, if not in more of their specifics of implementation. Considering these subsystems, their interactions, and the function of the system as a whole, the cause of the loss may be found. Losses in one-of-a-kind systems can be investigated using a systems approach.

Chain of Causation

One-of-a-kind systems can suffer complex sequences of failure in a chain of causation. One-of-a-kind systems can also be vulnerable to an outside factor that triggers a chain of interactions within the system leading to a breakdown, fire or explosion. The root cause is not always a flaw in the design.

One or Few-of-Kind Systems Have Unique Losses

The problems posed in investigating losses in one-of-a-kind systems and the advantages of a systems approach apply equally well when there are "few-of-a-kind". Let's start by assuming there are very low numbers of a particular system. If the rate of loss is low then it is likely that a given loss will be the first loss in such a system — the loss will be unique. Without other losses, there are no shortcuts, no list of problem areas to check. The possibility of functional exemplars is one advantage of losses in few-of-a-kind over one-of-a-kind systems.

The Insured Might Own All the Systems

Perhaps the insured is not only the user but also the manufacturer of the system. Perhaps this system constitutes a competitive advantage for the insured and that is why they build their own systems and these systems do not exist anywhere else. (Absolute discretion is always required, but in these cases, the insured might attempt to shut down an investigation if there is any uncertainty that their secrets might leak out. We understand the special concerns in these cases.) When an equipment manufacturer has a unique system that provides tremendous competitive advantage to users, they may choose to lease it to users. In this way, the manufacturer can maintain more control over the technology involved and get a larger slice of the profits derived from their systems. Lastly and most commonly, the system might be a more common form; however, it is custom-manufactured in small batches for each customer. While units from different orders may look superficially the same, only the insured's units are identical to each other. Any loss that arises from a quirk in the customizations will be unique to that order.

In any case, it is not uncommon to find that the insured owns all of the identical systems. Correctly identifying the cause provides important opportunities for loss control.

One/Few-of-a-Kind Systems: Familiar Pieces and New Causes of Loss

The subsystems of one-of-a-kind systems are still familiar to an experienced engineer by their function, if not also in the specifics of their implementation. For instance, a particular system may have hydraulics, or use a particular type of valve, or follow an operation cycle that bears some similarities to others. The answers are seldom found at this level. Certainly there may have been a system in the past with some commonality that suffered a failure — an experienced forensic engineer has seen a lot of losses.

Simple commonalities are not enough to conclude cause. Certainly pipes can freeze, valves can stick, hoses can burst, but, these are all well-known phenomena engineers are familiar with. Dozens, if not thousands, of other systems that have suffered no breakdowns or fires will share some commonalities with a given system. An engineer would not impugn a system by saying for instance it employed (gasp) "hydraulics" — said with the same intonation as "thalidomide". If commonality were dictated loss, losses in systems would be so much easier to investigate, reduced to the task of naming the "flawed" technologies it is composed of.

Commonalities are merely starting points. The investigator must have the training and experience to use these starting points to dig deeper. If a system has some aspect that makes it more prone to loss, then it is more likely in how the technologies are specifically implemented and how the subsystems were combined and interact. Each new combination of subsystems and components presents new possible failures and possibly a chain of causation. Combinations, implementations and interactions may be less tangible, more abstract for the layman.

The purpose of forensic engineering is not only to find the cause. It is also to put the cause and sequence of failure into familiar terms for the client and the Court. It is the expert's job to take the photographs, and draw the sketches, and write the report that makes the connections and points out the gaps